What did Hashemi say about accepting the resolution?

 

                                                  Tell me about the initial steps to accept the resolution:

      

  First, the UN resolution was issued a long time ago, and we neither accepted nor opposed it. From the beginning of 1366, after several meetings in the gathering of leaders and sometimes in the service of the Imam, we decided to participate in the Security Council and let it be discussed about finding the initiator of the war. Of course, it was decided that our first priority is to equip the facilities so that we can be strong in the front so that the discussion of the resolution does not affect the military weakness.

The second priority at this stage was to carefully review the provisions of the resolution for how to include our demands, which was our policy on the issue of war, and in this regard, the commission to collect documents of Iraqi aggression was formed under the supervision of Ayatollah Khamenei in 1366.

For the first priority, public mobilization was organized and the General Staff was formed and other works aimed at strengthening the war. One of our important tasks for this priority was the wide publicity for the entry of all the facilities of the country to strengthen the fronts, which shocked Iraq and its foreign supporters, who changed the resolution to our liking.

There were two or three important and sensitive points in the priority and delay of clauses, which were moved based on very good political negotiations. Dr. Velayati, Dr. Mohammad Javad Larijani and their colleagues managed the negotiations with the United Nations very well. Of course, the United Nations also behaved well. Mr. East
Perez Decoyar really wanted to solve the problem, so he worked impartially.

He also had a trip to Iran, before which one or two resolutions were passed against Iraq due to chemical attacks and bombing of cities, which they showed poison to Saddam. For example, in May 1366, the Security Council issued a statement condemning the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. Anyway, when we entered the negotiations, the global publicity was also in our favor. In the incident of chemical bombing in Halabja, the world really dealt with the responsibility in informing.

The combination of these made the global environment in this sector to be in our favor and the United Nations was able to meet our demands in the resolution. For example, Iraq, with a mischievous act in the clauses of the resolution, had placed the acceptance of the ceasefire before the withdrawal. If the resolution was accepted with this order of clauses, we would accept the ceasefire and Iraq would not retreat for a long time. That is, we had accepted the ceasefire and even implemented it, but parts of our land were still occupied by Iraq, which makes the people of the country question our tenacity in the war for 8 years.

Iraq’s goals were met and we remained under occupation. People were certainly discouraged that we accepted the resolution while Iraq is still in Iran. Another mischief was that after these two clauses, they had delicately added that any country that violates the ceasefire will be recognized as a criminal and must be punished.

Maybe years after we accepted the ceasefire, Iraq would not retreat and we could not do anything considering the above. Therefore, our political negotiators at the United Nations tried very hard to change the place of these two clauses. It means to withdraw to the borders first and then accept the ceasefire.

It was really a very important thing that was done for the benefit of Iran.

Finally, when the text of the resolution became acceptable to us and Mr. Rezaei’s letter reached the Imam, the Imam was convinced that the continuation of the war in these conditions is a slogan and even if they wanted to, they could not fight.
 

○ Apparently, in that meeting, you suggested that in order to preserve the Imam’s image in the society and his loyalty to the slogans, you, as the commander of the war, should announce this issue, which apparently the Imam did not accept. Apparently, in the same meeting, things were mentioned that remained silent until now.

  What remained silent will remain silent for the time being and I will not say it. I said many times that I don’t want to say.

 

○ Are you talking about that meeting?

  In the meeting of the heads of forces and with others we consulted, we came to the conclusion that we should accept the resolution. For this reason, we came to Imam’s service and discussed. We discussed the situation and Mr. Rezaei’s letter and the government’s letter and other issues were raised.

The main issue was accepted to accept the resolution. The discussion continued as how to announce. Imam said: We said many times that if the war lasts for 20 years, we will stop and fight until the last breath and the last drop of blood. These words of ours are in the ears of the people. We don’t want people to mistrust us.

When the discussion came to this, I said: If this is the case, I now have the authority on your behalf and will govern in your place. If you allow me, I will declare acceptance, which is naturally valid. When the work goes ahead and is implemented, you will judge me. But let the work be done first, so that the responsibility falls on me and those who are dissatisfied, consider me responsible for this work.

They first said something that we didn’t accept and then they didn’t accept my offer either.
 

○ After 20 years, you really don’t want to say what the imam said in that meeting?

  Not
 

○ Some say that his speech was in line with the need to preserve you for the future of the system.

  These words were also said, but the imam said something related to himself that we did not accept and we all strongly opposed.
 

○ This point is about resignation  Was it related to the imam that was mentioned in your memories of 1963?

  No, in 1963, Imam’s feeling of tiredness was due to the peak of physical fatigue and was not related to this issue.
 

○ Mr. Mohsen Rezaei said in an interview: We had accepted the resolution a few months ago.

  This is contrary to reality. On the same day that we decided to accept it and discussed it with the imam and he accepted it, we announced it. Maybe they have their own opinion.
 

○ They meant that we accepted unannounced. The reason is the series of negotiations that we started with the United Nations.

  As I said, in the service of the Imam, we had two priorities for war policies. I said that the first priority was to strengthen our military power in the war. We wanted to let the world and Saddam know that we are serious about continuing the war.
 

○ There was no opposition to this policy among the leaders?

  I do not remember.
 

○ Some people now say that Mr. Mousavi was in favor of war.

Government letters that are available.
 

○ Was the imam convinced based on the letters or did they reach this conclusion in the meetings?

  They were convinced little by little based on a set of factors. They saw the government saying: I can’t pay for the war. The army commander says: I can’t fight with this amount of resources. The army did not comment. He said that we are soldiers and surrendered.

When they saw the combination of these factors, they were convinced. As we were convinced. We, who were in charge of the country and commander of the war, wanted to win or continue more than others, but the realities of the field were different.

If Mr. Rezaei means our policy with the two priorities I mentioned, then it is correct. That is, we made two decisions. It was a decision for military action and mobilization of the country’s resources to say that we want to continue the war. Another decision was to move in the direction of negotiation so that the resolution can be accepted.
 

○ In the previous meeting, we said that some critics of your memoirs believe that two strategies were used in the war and Mr. Hashemi’s strategy led to the resolution. If the Imam’s strategy, which was “war war until victory”, was based instead of “war war until victory”, the work would not have ended here. Some even believe in three strategies in war. Some believe that Imam used to say: “War, war, until sedition is removed from the world”, the army used to say: “War, war until victory” and Mr. Hashemi said: “War, war until a victory”.

In the analysis I wrote on the criticism of this article, I stated that it is impossible to believe such a conflict in strategies to say that there was a difference. Because those two slogans were not strategies, they were a great ideal. The real strategy was to gain the upper hand in the war, so that if we had to negotiate, we would have a higher bargaining power. That is, this strategy was ultimately the common strategy of all officials. Was it like this?

It certainly was. First of all, it is not true that only I said it. Because it was not just me. In the meeting of the leaders, after consulting with reliable advisors, we came to the conclusion that we should do this. Before the first trip of the command to the war zones, I told the Imam that I would go with this opinion. They smiled in response to me. They did not answer positively or negatively.
 

○ What was your impression of that smile?

Two states were created in me. Either they agree, but they don’t say it in order to maintain the morale of the warriors, or maybe they considered these words imaginary. Because if they had a clear answer, they would have said it. They gave my answer ambiguously.
 

○ Apparently, after the acceptance of the resolution, the Imam did not make a public speech until the end of his life, and he mostly sent messages and met, and news and pictures of it were broadcasted, but he did not give a speech. In your opinion, what effects did this decision have on the Imam? Did they think that their presuppositions and previous performance were too idealistic and not realistic that they expressed their discomfort to this extent? His message is full of these kinds of emotions. Or not, if they entered again, would they follow the same route?

Maybe the answer to this question is in my memories this year. I don’t remember if I mentioned this issue in the memoirs of 1367 or 1368, but it is true that the Imam once expressed his satisfaction that the war ended in this way. It is in my memories who said these words and in the presence of whom.
 

○ The fact that the war ended with these conditions and we preserved the country was an acceptable result. But how did the Imam feel about this decision?

  I said that the Imam expressed satisfaction with that decision in a meeting.
 

○ Our discussion is about previous decisions.

  Imams never went back on the decisions they made about war. Imam’s strong logic during the 8 years of war was that we do our duty and the result is with God. This was Imam’s usual saying. At that time, they had decided that we should fight, and based on that decision, we performed our duties. If they mentioned “until sedition” in the objectives of the war, it was based on the inference of ijtihad from the verse of the Qur’an which says: Of course, perhaps it was in their imaginations that the war should be continued even if the war is not heated, until the sedition is resolved. These thoughts were in his being. But that’s what you heard in the speeches and comments. When there were incidents about revolution and war, they consoled us and said: “You who strive for God, do not despair, because God knows how to act.”
 

○ You didn’t feel any noticeable changes in the imam’s behavior due to the acceptance of the resolution?

  We did not feel at all. With the same spirit, they continued their ingenious leadership in affairs. Not only did I not see the feeling of unhappiness in their existence, but we heard statements that showed that they were satisfied with the end of such a war. For example, very soon they ordered the country’s officials to formulate construction policies.
 

○ So why didn’t they make a public speech?

  I do not know. You should pay attention to the documents. If they did not give a speech, it is not a reason to be upset with the resolution. During their stay in the country, sometimes they did not give speeches for one to two months, and we approached them and said that it is not good for the morale of the people. For example, they interrupted their lectures on the pretext of Ramadan. This happened many times. In addition, in the last months, he had developed signs of illness that caused him a lot of pain.
 

○ Mr. Rezaei said that after accepting the resolution, they went to the imam one Friday and cried a little and had a mental crisis. As the commander of the war, after accepting the resolution, did you not have this feeling regarding the Marsad operation and the events before and after it? How was your mental condition? Because you continued a revolutionary action for many years and once you had reached a stage that was contrary to that type of thinking for the continuation of the war.

  I felt happy. Due to my responsibility in the war, no one like me was aware of the details of the war news, especially the number of casualties. The killing of Iraqis was also sad for me. When I heard it, I was crushed inside. I was really sad to see Muslims fighting and killing each other, especially the Shiites, who were the majority of Iraqis who were killed. I really felt comfortable after accepting the ceasefire. In terms of emotional feelings, my conditions that day were similar to the conditions of these days after resigning from the presidency of the Assembly of Experts. Of course, due to the great difference in the importance of the matter in those days, I felt a very heavy duty on my shoulders, and in my conversations with God, I said: God, I don’t know what to say in response to my responsibilities? Really, my feelings after finalizing the non-acceptance of responsibility in the experts and after finalizing the acceptance of the resolution were similar.

Really, in the last months, especially after the Halabja incident, I was worried about the continuation of the war and the spread of that style in Iranian cities such as Tabriz, Kermanshah and even Tehran. Really, that style of fighting was not expedient. The possibility of mass killings was very high with the confidence that the world powers would not allow us to win the war militarily. We should have won politically, which we did. Indeed, God fulfilled his promise of victory to the Mujahideen for Iran.

Maybe it was hard to judge these words in those days, but now it is very easy to understand that God’s promise was really fulfilled. Where is Saddam now? Where is the Baath party? Where is Saddam’s family? In whose hands is Iraq? America itself, which supported Saddam at that time, is now trapped in Iraq and does not know what to do? Staying or leaving is a disgrace for him. All those who were somehow in the Iraq war with us against Iran are now seeing their punishment. This is the fulfillment of God’s promise.

I saw the peak of the fulfillment of God’s promise during last year’s trip to Iraq, when I, Mr. Rezaei and several military officials who were war commanders, saw one of the three Iraqi forces in Saddam’s palace and heard the Iraqi forces singing the anthem of the Islamic Republic of Iran. They whisper the flag of our country. This was the most objective sign of Iran’s victory in 8 years of holy defense.

We really had very few supporters in the UN Security Council in those days. It was a great victory that we were able to include our opinions. Surely God put this state in their hearts that they thought that we still want to fight with all our strength, that they wanted to end that state of war that would lead to our victory. Anyway, we didn’t think they would accept it so easily and bring it in the resolution. Of course, we also tried and Iran’s demands were met. We fought sincerely  And we sincerely accepted the resolution. We trusted God and God helped us.
 

○ My sustenance was incalculable.

  It really is. The children really fought. Those of us who were in the political or command fields and did not have the moods of those who fought in the trenches and trenches of the front lines. God does not leave those efforts unrewarded. It is clear that such mujahid people should get the answer for their efforts from God.
 

○ There is a sentence attributed to the imam, who said after the crowd of people to confront the sedition of the hypocrites during the operation of Mursad: “If I had known that people were still willing to sacrifice like this, I would not have accepted the resolution.”

  I think that attributing this sentence to Imam (RA) is a lie and a great injustice to him. I don’t know who is saying these words, but whoever it is, is sick. Not only the Imam, but all of us and even the military forces had special mental states at different times. At one time, we wanted to fight inside Iraq, and if we had a defensive posture, it was in Faw, Halabja, Mawout and other places. This situation, like the first years of the war when we were fighting for the liberation of the country, had no spiritual support. At this stage as you say, the people saw that the enemy is occupying the country again, so they rushed to the fronts. Even those who were cut off from the war, returned to the fronts. Of course, confronting the hypocrites in the Mersad operation did not require that amount of force. The hypocrites were not figures in terms of quantity and quality. There were two to three thousand people that the forces on the front were working with the help of Hwaniroz and the Air Force.
 

○ In the memoirs of 1967 that we were studying, we saw that there was a kind of severe disunity between the IRGC and the army forces, who gave many reports to you and the commanders, which were immediately denied. It is true that behind the front because of Imam’s message, the morale of the people to be at the front was strengthened, but there was a kind of lack of cohesion among the military forces stationed at the fronts.

  This is normal. Because the movement of the hypocrites was based on complete surprise. I was in the south at that time. When the problem of the south was over and our forces neutralized the invasion of Iraqis and returned them to the borders, together with Ayatollah Khamenei we decided that they should stay and I would go to the army that was supposed to operate. When I arrived in the middle of the road, they informed me that the army had retreated. That is, he advanced a little in the operation and returned. We said let’s go and visit the northwest front. We changed our way and on the way we realized that the hypocrites had passed Taq Bostan and were coming towards Islamabad. We went to Kermanshah on the three-way of Islamabad, and when we arrived, they said that the hypocrites had also reached Islamabad.

If our forces knew, they would have thought to prevent their movement. All the way they came was in our hands. However, it took several hours for the troops to come to their senses and identify the area and map the geographical situation.
 

○ Your sermon after the Mersad operation was very historic. Even though I was a teenager, I still remember what you said: We decided to stop them in Islamabad, as some people said to let them come to Kermanshah so that they have no way back.

 

It means that you delivered that sermon with a special epic mood. Now that we refer to the documents, we see that your sermon was more of a psychological war to strengthen the morale of the people and warriors. Was it really your decision to come to Kermanshah or was there no one to stop them and they were advancing? Or did you want to maintain the spirit of the country with that kind of analysis?

  I don’t remember what words I used in that sermon. Anyway, the result was that they got tangled up on the way to Kermanshah. First, when we found out, they were in Islamabad. That much is clear. They even gave us a report that the army forces captured two or three of them and took them to a camp where one of them, who was a girl, slapped the commander of the camp firmly on the ear. They thought they would take all of Iran.

I was in Kermanshah when the IRGC commanders insisted that I not stay in Kermanshah. They believed that the hypocrites would capture Kermanshah. I said: I must stay so that you stay and the forces fight.

When I refused to go out of Kermanshah, they gathered in the place where we were and we made very good decisions on how to deal with it.
 

○ Apparently, the Iraqi forces broke their entry line with bombings and shelling and opened the way for them to enter. Especially, they bombarded the barracks of Allah Akbar. Among the possibilities of Morsad operation was the fear of using chemical weapons. The hypocrites came with tanks that had rubber wheels instead of sand, and we could have stopped them at the Karand pass, but they came as far as Kermanshah.

  Yes, they easily passed by the large barracks of Allah Akbar, which is on the side of the Islamabad-Kermanshah road. Of course, if we had a battalion ready in the camp, they could not have passed, but they had advanced.

Anyway, if the tactic was what I said, maybe it was because of the decisions of some commanders.
 

○ The hypocrites recognized each other by the white cloth they tied on their arms, and our forces did not recognize each other. It took a long time for them to realize how they know each other and attack our forces.

  Were you in Islamabad that night?
 

○ No, we arrived the next night when the city was occupied by the hypocrites.

When I returned from the fronts for Friday prayer sermons, I still didn’t know how many people were killed. Secondly, in order to maintain the spirit of the people, it was necessary to speak epically. Thirdly, the operation of our forces started when they passed through Hasan Abad and came to the back of the “Four Rough Neck”. I watched that line myself. I had sent Mahdiman, who was in Basij at the front those days, to that point to give me the right information very quickly. I even went and saw the battle scenes with a camera from the top of the mountain. The commanders did not let me stay long and I returned.

I mean the number of our dead, the martyrs of the operation we did to stop them. The hypocrites were really surrounded. Because the forces from the south had also entered through the Islamabad junction. Many of the forces of the hypocrites fled through the mountains and the desert. They could not return through Islamabad. Because their way was closed.
 

○ Of course, those who have these criticisms say that when we went to the fronts during the war, we saw defeats, but when we listened to Mr. Hashemi’s sermons, we felt that we were on the verge of victory and got inspired. Their criticism is that Mr. Hashemi does not have that function now. When they analyze, the state that we are on the verge of victory is not felt from their words. Their complaints are that you leave failures and inefficiencies unsaid, like during the war, and you should analyze in such a way that we don’t have any problems.

  These friends do not pay attention to the fact that I accepted the war then and believed in the jihad of the forces, and now I do not accept some actions.

Anyway, the resolution is one of our masterpieces at the end of the war. Regarding the Friday prayer sermons, I must also say that I never explained to the people the weak points of the troops’ performance in the war. To be fair, there were always enough strengths to maneuver on. I relied on those issues.

Regarding the two policies regarding the sacred defense, i.e. the authoritative continuation of the war and attending the international forums to discuss the inclusion of the demands in the resolution, we acted completely based on the Imam’s opinions. Even in my memories, the people in charge of the political negotiations had doubts at a time when the Imam emphasized on military affairs, and they asked the Imam and he said: They do their work at the front and you do yours.

Our intention was to be serious in the negotiations to accept the resolution and to be serious in the battlefield to continue the war. Both measures had no contradictions. Because we wanted to reach a resolution from the position of power so that we can fulfill our demands. In other words, we were completely coordinated in implementing both policies, and we really succeeded, and our negotiating team worked very well, and the military forces fought very well until the last days.
 

○ It was once quoted from the words of the Imam that he had warned His Highness and other officials of the country that America and the Soviet Union would come to a conclusion about the war. Did the imam have such an opinion on the policies of the western and eastern governments?

  Imam always said. Even at the time of the conquest of Khorramshahr, one of their reasons for not allowing Iran to enter Iraq was that, first of all, the Arab countries, with a sense of Arab nationalism, were clearly behind Saddam, and the world powers, with their propaganda, were manipulating the issue that Iran would enter Iraq. Iraq has invaded.

This concern was the reality that they had finally met. During the war, both the Soviet Union and the United States provided advanced weapons to Iraq.
 

○ Did the imam warn about this issue?

  I don’t remember that they said anything explicitly. Maybe they had recommendations on how to operate. Because they knew that our opinion is the same. Of course, this may be related to the time when the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps crushed Tudeh Party members in Iran, and the Soviet Union returned from its apparently neutral policy and openly supported Iraq. Of course, I don’t know exactly what the Imam said and when it was related. mostajar