Hassan Rouhani, the first secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, who became responsible for the country’s nuclear file at the end of Mohammad Khatami’s administration and at the same time as tensions over Iran’s nuclear program rose, has recently published his memories of 22 months of managing Iran’s nuclear negotiations .
This book, called National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy, contains Mr. Rouhani’s memories of complicated internal negotiations and talks with foreign parties and related documents in 999 pages.
Iran’s nuclear negotiations after the talks related to the acceptance of Resolution 598 and the ceasefire with Iraq are considered to be among the most complex, fateful and profound international crises of Iran.
The importance of Mr. Rouhani’s memoirs is that the topics covered in it are still the subject of today’s debates and the decisions made by Iran’s high-ranking officials and leaders are tied to the fate of 75 million Iranians, and its effects and consequences are still ongoing .
Among the things included in Mr. Rouhani’s memoirs are the form of decision-making in Iran’s political structure regarding fateful and historical issues, the way of summarizing decisions, and the impact of different people’s attitudes on a single issue. In addition, these memoirs include important details of the manner and content of Iran’s nuclear negotiation group’s talks with the Europeans, which makes it possible for foreigners to judge the performance of this group and Iran’s main decision makers.
Mr. Rouhani’s book tries to pretend during the period when he and Iran’s nuclear negotiating group were experiencing commitment to Western countries; Increasing the scope of sanctions and political and economic problems caused by the nuclear approach of his successors is a kind of response to history and appearing before the jury of public opinion..
One of the first parts of the book is the description of the problems facing Iran in national dialogues. Hassan Rouhani openly complains about this issue and writes that the threshold of dialogue at the national level in Iran is low and with this situation, reaching a national consensus may take several years. To insinuate in a way that if a wrong decision was made during his time, the fault lies with the structure of the system and not with him and his colleagues.
Referring to his 22-month experience as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, he writes that in Iran, “we are not used to dialogue and agreement, and as a result of several discussions after several meetings, they are drawn into fights and hostilities, and the parties They condemn each other to naivety, passivity, intimidation and extremism and the negotiation is dismantled. One should ask him why his administration has been silent for 16 years?
Global crisis and domestic solutions
Iran’s nuclear case was found during the meeting of the first half of 2013, the next international board of governors.
The Council of Governors, with the consensus of all members, had given Iran 50 days to sign the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States of America had called Iran one of the axes of evil, and the American army, together with the coalition forces, had overthrown the Iraqi government in Iran’s neighborhood and had taken control of Baghdad within a short period of time.
According to Hassan Rouhani, the American conspiracy against the regime was not far from the mind; This word of his focuses the mind on the fact that America’s attack was certain, so we had no choice but to give points.
In this situation, the ministers of foreign affairs from Britain, France and Germany sent a message to Iran demanding that this country join the additional protocol and announced their readiness to attend Tehran. At that time, the officials of the nuclear negotiations were Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and Ali Akbar Salehi, the then ambassador of this country in Vienna (now the foreign minister) .
Mr. Rouhani writes in this book that the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran was not aware of the dimensions of the nuclear crisis and had a “weak legal expertise”; This kind of look is considered as self-exculpation because it has been seen many times that people clear the face of the problem by throwing the ball on the neighbor’s field.
According to his writing, before the resolution and the 50-day deadline of the Agency, Gholamreza Aghazadeh said that Iran’s case is not an important issue and it will be closed in the Agency soon, and the Iranian Ambassador to the Agency had also sent a message that Iran does not pose a threat to the Council of Governors and the possibility There is no resolution.
Mr. Rouhani points to the limited power of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the lack of trust between this ministry and the Atomic Energy Organization and says that a number of deputy ministers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pressured the then minister Kamal Kharazi to delegate matters to the Supreme National Security Council .
How did Rouhani enter?
The National Security Council was born during the presidency of Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani and the first days after the death of Imam Khomeini and the change in the Iranian constitution. During the discussions held in the Constitutional Revision Council in 1368, following the example of the American National Security Council and with the aim of centralizing decisions, Hassan Rouhani, the commander of the air defense base and the first head of the construction base of Khatam al-Anbia to establish a new council which was included in the revised constitution, took the mandate.
Mr. Rouhani writes that the council had previously predicted Saddam Hussein’s decision to attack Kuwait and the fall of the Soviet Union, and with the “successful management” he undertook in the case of the coalition forces’ attack on Afghanistan and Iraq, the factions’ confidence and He had internal groups with him.
According to his writing, after the insistence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mohammad Khatami, the President of Iran, encouraged him to take up the nuclear issue. “On the evening of Mehr 12, 2002, Mr. Khatami’s handwritten letter to start work” arrived at Hassan Rouhani’s office as the official of the atomic negotiations, but according to his memories, he “put the letter in the desk drawer”. In fact, he wants to say that the presidency of the government has not accepted the reforms by heart.
A few hours later, in his meeting with the supreme leader of the revolution, Imam Khamenei Madzaleh, he asked him to be in charge of the negotiations and “take the burden off the shoulders of the system.” In this way, Hassan Rouhani started his work on one of the most challenging cases in Iran’s contemporary history on 12 Mehr 1382. In this matter, he delicately wants to prove his obedience to the leadership.
How was the negotiating team determined? How did the crisis rise?
Iran’s nuclear negotiating team had serious critics and defenders during the 22-month negotiation period during the presidency of Iran. Some groups inside considered them to be devoted to the West and some factions considered them to be the most capable diplomats of the country.
In one of the meetings of the Supreme Nuclear Committee, Mr. Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Advisor to the leadership, spoke about the lack of diplomatic skills in the Atomic Energy Organization and said that Mr. Mohammad Javad Zarif, Dr. Al-Barzi and Engineer Naseri are the most capable. Our people are in international affairs. Dr. Kharazi (Minister of Foreign Affairs) also said that these three people are the best people of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in international affairs.
Ali Rabiei and Ali Aghamohammadi took responsibility for the propaganda, and a few months later, Hossein Mousavian, along with Sadegh Kharazi, Mohammad Hossein Adeli, the Iranian ambassadors in France and Britain, and Mohammad Saeedi, the international deputy of the Atomic Energy Organization, joined the group of negotiators.
According to Hassan Rouhani, one year before the deadline was issued in the Council of Governors, the opinion of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran was to complete the Nazanz facilities and then announce it to the agency. But unfortunately, this approach made the organization’s future plans difficult
Mr. Rouhani refers to the visit of Mohammad ElBaradei, then Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to Natanz, and the report on the causes of contamination with low-level enriched uranium, and writes that with the discovery of 79% contamination in Natanz, “serious problems for the country will begin.” became.
Mr. Rouhani writes that the Atomic Energy Organization was unaware of the existence of contamination and the devices that this organization had for detecting contamination were old and could not detect existing contamination.
According to Mr. Rouhani, the level of contamination discovered was so high that the Atomic Energy Organization was also surprised by its existence, and this matter shocked the country.
According to Mr. Rouhani, with the help of the countries from which Iran had bought second-hand enrichment equipment, the reasons for the existence of a part of various contaminations were clarified for the agency, but the interesting point is the cooperation of the government of Muammar Gaddafi, the leader of Libya at the time, with the international agency. Atomic energy and the dismantling of this country’s nuclear policy.
The concern of reformers
According to Hassan Rouhani, Gaddafi had introduced the seller of centrifuges in the black market to the agency, and by arresting this person in one of the Southeast Asian countries, the agency had reached Iran’s shopping list .
Before Iran was informed about the issue, the agency wanted an explanation from Iran about the payment of three million dollars for a purchase from the black market, and according to Mr. Rouhani, it was looking for a seller of “second generation centrifuges” to Iran .
Mr. Rouhani writes that the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran first said that he had downloaded the maps from the Internet, but then the inspectors of the agency even reminded the Iranian authorities of the precise and sliding location where this map was located, which surprised them. Was.
Mr. Rouhani informs about the existence of several spies in the Atomic Energy Organization and writes that “what ‘s worse is that the Ministry of Intelligence told us that there are several others that we could not arrest .”
In the section on Iran’s dispute with the IAEA, the author mentions other similar cases and writes that there was another issue that goes back to the previous years and the presidency of Reza Amrollahi, the former head of the Atomic Energy Organization.
About the issue of “laboratory production of a small amount of UF4 (substance prepared for uranium enrichment), the agency said that this laboratory production was published in treatises; After checking, it turned out that a student mentioned this issue in his dissertation .
And this treatise is available in the university library
After Iran’s report to the IAEA about the country’s nuclear activities, according to Mr. Rouhani, “Al Bardaei said that what Iran said are the same things that we already knew through other means.” According to Hassan Rouhani, Western countries, America and the Arabs knew about Iran’s nuclear activities years before.
In the book, the author talks about the difficulties of negotiations and resolving the ambiguities bit by bit with the agency and sometimes the expected results are lost .
Mr. Rouhani writes about his meeting with Al Bardaei in Vienna and says that he said that we do not know what to do with your Atomic Energy Organization, I am confused. At one time, the organization said that our technology is indigenous, after digging and asking many questions, they said that 70,000 parts are imported. We bought it in 1995, after a while they said that a part was imported in 1985, then they said that no injection was done (to the centrifuges). From the conversations, it became clear that the injection was done. How to work with you with this created atmosphere?
He writes about the agreements and oppositions inside with uranium enrichment and says that the reformists and part of the representatives of the 6th Parliament used to say, “The Atomic Energy Organization wants to overthrow the government.” . . The reformists thought that the Atomic Energy Organization was not loyal to the government and wanted to trouble it“
In this book, Hassan Rouhani refers to his memories of the advice of the authorities of other countries to end the rising international crisis .
Among the interesting references in the book are the statements of the then foreign minister of China during his visit to Tehran, who told Mr. Rouhani in private negotiations, “If I were in charge of Iran, I would say that you should define a period for your economic and scientific progress, and then take power.” Stand tall.” Russian President Vladimir Putin told him in Moscow, “We will help you, but we will not sit in your boat.” We are neighbors, but we cannot jeopardize our interests .”
He quoted similar statements from Jack Straw, the British Foreign Minister at the time, Javier Solana, the former EU foreign policy official and the French ambassador at the time in Tehran. “We have to suspend for a year and a half to resolve the issues by building trust“
Thank Bazarian for signing the additional protocol
One of the interesting points of the book is the story of the presence of three European ministers in Tehran on the last day of Mehr 1382, which led to the acceptance of the additional protocol and the suspension of uranium enrichment in Iran .
Mr. Rouhani writes about the difficulties of the negotiations with the three European ministers, over the word-for-word determination of the final statement of the Tehran meeting, the deadlocked negotiations with them, and the readiness of the German foreign minister at the time, Yoshka Fischer, to leave the negotiations and return to her country. He says, “The failure of the negotiations, in addition to the political aspects, also posed a security risk for Iran“
His phone call from the place of negotiations in Saad Abad Palace in Tehran with President Mohammad Khatami and his order to avoid failure and reach an agreement, and Mr. Rouhani’s call to the Supreme Leader’s office and report on the affairs are other interesting points .
He (Mohammed Khatami) said do not let the negotiations lead to failure, he added that whatever your decision is, I accept and support it. I also contacted the Supreme Leader’s office to transfer the issues to the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, but there was no news. Therefore, the conditions were prepared for a kind of maneuver in terms of setting sentences and phrases .
In the meantime, Mr. Rouhani points to the subject of the photo in which he is laughing with British Foreign Minister Jack Straw, which was very reflective, and says that Straw told him at the end of the agreement and before the press conference that Tony Blair ( British Prime Minister) is in the hospital and I told him that you probably don’t want him to be discharged so soon, we both laughed .
Another quote by the author is from Jack Straw, which is related to his reaction to the demonstrations of Basiji students in front of Saadabad Palace in protest of the annexation protocol . Rouhani writes that Straw laughs and says to Kamal Kharazi : How much did you pay them to come here?
Mr. Rouhani says that after accepting the additional protocol, Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Keni (the current head of the Council of Leadership Experts) thanked him on behalf of Tehran’s marketers and said, “After a long period of crisis and stagnation and serious worries, the market is calm.” returned” and the marketers’ concerns have been resolved.
Hassan Rouhani points to the end of his working term after 16 years in the Supreme National Security Council and 22 months of nuclear negotiations, at the same time as the 12th day of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s inauguration, and writes that after the first and last meeting with Mr. Ahmadinejad, who demanded Rouhani’s contact with ElBaradei and “Iran has paid all the expenses of the Agency” called Ali Larijani and said “apparently you should prepare yourself to take care of things sooner”.
Mr. Rouhani in these memories about the conditions of the country and the pressure to end the suspensions at the end of the government of Mohammad Khatami, the opposition to negotiations with the United States and the rejection of George Bush’s proposal to resolve the differences with Iran and the loss of the referendum proposal that the heads of the country with They were not against it, but they didn’t think it was appropriate at the same time as the presidential election, he narrates. He says with a regretful and sad tone, “The basis of affairs in Iran’s Supreme National Security Council is not to worry, but in these six years, the worries have not decreased .”
In conclusion, he says, “If we want to identify the person responsible for the destruction of this process, one was the United States, one was the weakness and doubts of Europe, and the other was the pressure of some people and internal groups, and the last one was the story of the Iranian elections .”
The publication of Hassan Rouhani’s memoirs seems to be the result of a combination of narration and writing, which has caused some topics to be repeated many times unnecessarily .
However, the publication of this 999-page book is an unprecedented and rare act in Iran, which makes accessible the memories of political leaders in explaining and clarifying their time of responsibility. This work is customary in most developed countries and in some developing countries, and it paves the way for research and writing and historical research, not for the distant and darkened years in the mind, which along with the developments of the day .
It seems that by repeatedly criticizing the negotiating group headed by Mr. Rouhani and the fading of historical facts in this important period of Iran, Hassan Rouhani has come close to his goal by writing this book .
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