Sardar Fethullah Jafari, the head of Martyr Hasan Bagheri Institute, according to his own interpretation, had contact with this martyr on two occasions. The first stage in 1959 and in the midst of the imposed war against Iran, and the second stage in 1981, when he assumed the responsibility of president of Shahid Hassan Bagheri Institute. We had a conversation with this commander of the Islamic Guard about the personal and managerial qualities of Shahid Bagheri. The
Please explain a little about how you met Shahid Bagheri. In which operation and how did you get to know each other? Give a history of his activities before and during the revolution, as well as how he entered the war.
I got to know Sardar Bagheri in two stages. The first stage corresponds to the year 59 when the war started. About a month had passed since the war when I came to the south (Gulf) from Kurdistan and found out that Mr. Daud Karimi was in charge of the operation and Mr. Hassan Bagheri was in charge of the information of the operation. Before that, I knew that these two were the officials of the War Department, but I did not deal with them directly. The second phase of my acquaintance with Shahid Bagheri is related to these ten years that we have been working on his works and life. Birth, youth, high school, university, entering the revolution, after the revolution, etc., we have almost become familiar with his life. In these ten years, more than those two and a half years of war, we have learned about their moods, characteristics and activities. Even many issues that we did not know during the war have become clear to us today. From 2001 (the 20th anniversary of martyrdom of Bagheri) until today, we have become more familiar with his life; A blessed, adventurous, eventful and tense life since he was born.
Please explain a little about the first phase of your acquaintance.
When I came to golf, I got to know him. Gulf was the headquarters of the southern operations in the war. When the war started, Mr. Daud Karimi and Mr. Hassan Bagheri settled there. They had made a war room and collected and reviewed maps of the area there. Above the war room, there was a large Hosseiniyeh, which was the place for prayer and the gathering of forces that wanted to be sent. In Aban 1959, a group of troops from Khorasan or Tehran wanted to be sent, and I saw someone justifying them. Before I came there, I myself was in Kurdistan and I was familiar with the war. From his way of dealing and expression, I realized that he is a well-informed person and gives appropriate advice. Later, when I asked, they said he is Hassan Bagheri.
Later, when we went to Abadan, I saw that he is really good at war and is a head above all in terms of information and speech. It was a few months after the war when I took responsibility and we got in touch. I got closer to him little by little and saw that in addition to being a good commander, he also has interesting morals and characteristics. It was fascinating. He was very careful in meetings and public interactions. He was honest and truthful. These interactions were interesting to me and I used to go on missions with them for different reasons. During the missions, I got to know more about his ethics and behavior and I used to say to myself that I have found a teacher of ethics and rules. I asked them my questions. He himself imitated the Imam and knew the issues completely.
He knew people quickly. For example, if you hear a person’s name once, it stays in your mind and then you gradually get to know that person’s characteristics, behavior and speech. It was interesting to me that he is so talented in knowing people. On the occasions that happened, I saw that he knows Iraqis in the same way. For example, when we used to listen to their voices on the wireless, you would understand that it was the voice of a certain Iraqi commander. He knew the information about them completely.
He strongly believed in staffing. For example, at the beginning of the war, a meeting was held in Golf, the commanders of the axes and corps gathered in the war room, and the newcomers who were placed at the level of responsibility of the axis were also present. Hassan used to sit next to them and justify them. This happened to me too. The first time I went to the war room, he explained to me what we do in the war room.
He was very careful in his speech, mannerisms and communication. He was consulted in matters. Even though he knew everything himself, he still took advice and everyone felt that they shared. Everyone said that we suggested to Hassan Bagheri to do such and such work, while he himself knew and wanted to involve others in the work and in some way cause the growth of those around him.
Two other prominent traits in him are really interesting to me. The first issue is that he did not want anything for himself. In fact, he did not own himself. He didn’t even know what he was wearing. He considered everything as a trust and did not want to use this trust as a power tool for himself. He used to say that what we have is a trust. The second issue was his popularity. Attention to others and the love of serving people were extremely important to him; That is, he considered the people as the main foundation and said that we should sacrifice for the people.
He was extremely sensitive to Imam’s orders. He considered Imam’s speeches as an executive order. It was very province-oriented. In general, the fact that he raised the issue of changing the war strategy was based on the order of the Imam. Mr. Bagheri compiled these materials and turned them into a program. It is very easy to find fault, but he saw the problems and found solutions for them.
The set of these traits made Hassan Bagheri a commander who had the authority to command. The fact that the Supreme Leader talks about him like this, as a designer, really shows his deep knowledge of Hassan Bagheri. It is very appropriate to say: Each of the commanders had good qualities, Hassan Bagheri had all the good qualities.
In the first six months of the war, he played a significant role in the changes and transformations, and he was also called the deadlock breaker by the Basijians during this period. Talk a little about this issue and that he gave a speech to the commanders at the same time and said with commendable self-confidence that the course of the war should be changed. How did this self-confidence come about in a 26-year-old young man?
Everyone thought that we would fight on the borders, but Iraq came with a policy and a plan and brought the war into our cities. This was a surprise for us. In a meeting of the Supreme Defense Council and even in a letter he wrote to the Imam, Bani Sadr said that this war is the longest war after World War II. Only four months had passed since the war. Iraq was deep and surrounded Abadan. It occupied Khorramshahr and Bostan and was at the gate of Sosangerd. The city of Ahvaz was under fire and the enemy was at the gates of Dezful. Either you have to fight them or you have to find another way.
After the Huyza operation, Saddam gives a speech and says that we have been considerate towards Iran until now and we defeated Iran in the Huyza operation. If Iran does not hand over Arvandroud and the three islands, we will continue the war. After Howeiza’s defeat, Bani Sadr became very disappointed and despaired and even gave an interview to the newspaper “Islamic Revolution” that we should defend our land for the time being. In a letter, Hassan Bagheri strongly protested to him why he said this in the interview. The enemy understands that our strategy is to defend and we will not attack, and from now on he will attack safely.
Bani Sadr, as the President and Commander-in-Chief, writes to the Imam that we do not have more ammunition for one month. Another issue he mentions is to release the American hostages to find a way to the world arms market. If we are to accept the long war, we must communicate. Bani Sadr writes this letter on the 18th of December. On the 20th of December, the Imam had a meeting with the cultural leaders of Tehran. There they say that desperation is one of the tricks of the devil. Devils make people despair. They want us to be dependent. They don’t want us to stand on our feet. They force the dependency to continue. This was originally in response to Bani Sadr’s letter, but people did not know why the Imam said these words. People like Hassan Bagheri understood that the Imam’s opinion is that the war should continue, that we should rely on ourselves and produce ammunition.
In golf, Mr. Hassan Bagheri realizes that Imam’s opinion is the continuation of the war. The only thing the IRGC could do at that time was reconnaissance; Identify the area well, know where the enemy is stationed, what capabilities they have, who are their commanders, etc. At this four-month point, based on the documents we have, the enemy was completely known to Hassan Bagheri. He knew how many armies the enemy had. Who are the commanders of the armies, what are their attitudes, where are they stationed with what talents? Shahid Bagheri had all the information, he knew the enemy well and he was also aware of the power of his own front. He weighed these two forces and made a decision and held a meeting in Golf with the presence of the commanders. In that meeting, he says that we can fight, we are not desperate, but it is not necessary to start with a big operation. We start with limited operations. Now how do we convey this to the imam? It could not be done through Bani Sadr, because he himself was desperate. It was not possible through the Supreme Defense Council. Martyr Bagheri’s only opportunity to convey this message to the Imam is the presence of the Supreme Leader in the Supreme Defense Council as the Imam’s representative in the war. Shahid Bagheri had known him since 1958 in the newspaper “Islamic Republic” and they even introduced Hassan Bagheri to the IRGC as the Supreme Leader himself.
Audio clip : The forgotten miracle
On the 22nd of January, three days after the Imam’s message, the Supreme Leader was invited to play golf. The Supreme Council of Defense were also: Mr. Rezaei, Rafiqdoost, Haj Abdullah Mahmudzadeh and Ebrahim Sanjaghi. That golf session was very decisive for the war. In that meeting, Hassan Bagheri presented a report based on the map to the Supreme Leader and the commanders and said that it is true that the enemy is strong, but we can fight back. We also have a solution, and our solution is to change from equipment-oriented thinking, which is Bani Sadr’s opinion, to faith-oriented; Because we are Muslims and God has promised us victory in verse 149 of Surah Al-Baqarah. There he promised us that one person with faith is equal to ten enemies. It is there that Hassan Bagheri proposes to change the strategy of the war, that we can continue the war with an approach of faith and Ashura culture and the presence of people in the war. The meeting lasted from morning to noon. Martyr Bagheri tried his best to make Imam’s words come true and had the courage to say these words. One can attack the weak points of the enemy if he knows the enemy well. After that he started designing and planning for some limited operations.
In that meeting, which was held on January 23, the Supreme Leader said to go and plan for a short-term plan and a long-term plan. Because he had an effective presence and role, this word reached everywhere. They said that in the short-term plan, find yourself, create a structure and organization and start working, and in the long-term plan, plan for the liberation of the occupied areas. This program was started by Hassan Bagheri.
After the defeat of Houizeh, the first successful movement was carried out on March 26, 1359 in Sosangerd under the name of Imam Mahdi operation with the code “Ya Mahdi Aderkani” and the person in charge of that operation, Mr. Ishaq Azizi, was martyred. The troops appeared very good and successful in the operation and captured sixty and seventy people. The same words that were said in golf, were implemented there and made us successful. Because it was for God and it was presented sincerely, God also gave his support. Even though it was his own work, he was looking for others to come and learn. He sought to expand his thinking so that everyone could work. He said to bring a plan, the whole plan might change, but the signature of the same person was under it. He wanted others to learn to work. He strongly emphasized on staffing and in these limited operations, one of his most important achievements was staffing. All those who later became army and camp commanders and many of the martyrs you see today, such as Mustafa Redanipour, Ahmad Foroughi, Kharazi, etc., were all under Hassan Bagheri. Framing is very important. The fronts were built based on this thinking, they didn’t tell westerners to come and teach. We were not dependent on the West and the East, it created the scene of human war.
Hassan Bagheri raised a problem in his theory that is very important and is not discussed in any army. He says: Our aim is not to kill and destroy the enemy. We must try not to be killed from both sides; Because the Iraqi forces are useful for the future of the Iraqi Islamic Revolution. These days, when we see the events in the region and Iraq, we realize Bagheri’s forward-looking outlook.
Martyr Bagheri was trying to activate the enemy’s refugee or captive forces in our own front. We only had two hundred Iraqis in Zarhi who were either refugees or prisoners. They helped us in the repair shop and support and were even present in the operation. If you listen to the conversations of Shahid Bagheri, you will see that he often says on the wireless that you should be careful not to disturb the prisoners. Why does he say this? Because his goal in the war was humanization and doing duty. His aim was not to kill. Before the operation, he gave us a list of enemy equipment and said to be careful not to destroy these equipment and facilities in this area.
In any case, that golf session had a favorable outcome, and the way to resolve the crisis was opened. No one even thought that we could overcome this crisis. The Iraqis used to say that a phenomenon has emerged on the Iranian front that is unknown to us. All our operations were checked by al-Bakr University in Baghdad. I remember Hassan Bagheri asking them who do you think is designing our operations? They said that you get advice from Korea, Syria, Pakistan, India, etc. Later, they themselves admitted that Iran’s operations are not compatible with any military. Because they were military, they understood that this type of attack is not compatible with the military system and is the result of a new way of thinking. Hassan Bagheri’s thinking worked on the fronts. He really thought about design. Designing requires accurate knowledge of the enemy, terrain, internal forces, balance of forces, etc. Balance of power is very important and Shahid Bagheri excelled in this work.
There were two operational plans for the liberation of Khorramshahr: One was provided by the army and the other by the IRGC. The IRGC’s plan was actually Hassan Bagheri’s plan, and ironically, the same plan was approved and based on that, Iran did. On the other hand, Martyr Hassan Bagheri says in his personal notes that the first stage of the liberation of Khorramshahr, i.e. the siege of the city, was not an objective decision but a subjective decision. He considered it wrong to make a siege in the first stage. Please explain a little about this.
The siege of Abadan was the plan of Hamza’s operation, which was written by Hassan Bagheri. They worked on it with Rahim Safavi and presented it in the Supreme Defense Council. In the Supreme Defense Council, the Supreme Leader said to justify the army as well. The 77th division was justified. What Hassan Bagheri predicted in his plan was that Iraq’s 3rd Army relies on two bridges and if we destroy these bridges, the 3rd Army will be encircled and this was our trump card, but Iraq did not think that we could to reach the bridges.
In order to reach the enemy’s obstacles, Bagheri had to break eight lines of defense. 24 hours before the operation, one of our intelligence forces was captured with a map and calculator, and everyone thought that Hassan Bagheri would delay the operation, but he did not change his plan. From Shadgan Creek, which was ten meters long and one meter deep, he sent a number of troops under the responsibility of Martyr Mustafa Redanipour from inside the canal to the enemy’s rear in the camp of the 6th Armored Brigade, which was in charge of the general command of this front. The commander of the 6th Armored Brigade was on leave. If the operation was delayed, the commander would return from leave and they would have to come from the Shadgan canal and walk 6 kilometers in water to reach the camp. The children say that we arrived at half past two. By capturing the bridge and the enemy’s camp, all the defense lines fell, a large number of enemy forces were captured and all their equipment was looted. Therefore, both the plan and the execution were accurate.
In the Jerusalem operation, there were two thoughts. One was to come from the Ahvaz road to the Nasr area, and the other plan was to cross Karun. The army’s plan was to cross the road and the army’s plan was to cross Karun. Hassan said that we cannot give two targets to one brigade at the same time, because they do not have the necessary flexibility and strength. As soon as they reached Ahvaz-Khorramshahr road, it was an important task. Many believed that crossing Karun is a stage of the operation. It cannot be said that Shahid Bagheri thought that our forces should cross Karun and go to Ahvaz-Khorramshahr road. Our going to Ahvaz-Khorramshahr road forced the enemy to react and this reaction continued until the end of the operation. Until they came to gather themselves on the Ahvaz-Khorramshahr road, our forces went to Shalamcheh, and we did not lose our initiative. Until they came to think about it, our forces surrounded Khorramshahr. We took twenty thousand prisoners in Jerusalem and ten thousand enemy tanks were in Khorramshahr. God’s help was in the first place, but careful planning was also involved.
I think Hassan Bagheri saw Khorramshahr in the golf room on January 23, 1959 and planned for its liberation. When we look at his plans, we see that he was always six months ahead. Hamza’s operation plan to break the siege of Abadan started in March of 1959 and the plan of Fatah Al-Mobin operation was written on October 21 of 1960; That is, six months before the operation. Jerusalem was the same.
The leader of the revolution has a saying: Fath al-Fatuh of Imam has been building faithful, sincere, healthy and honest young people, like Martyr Hassan Bagheri. In your opinion, why does Hazrat Agha, among all the achievements of the Islamic Revolution, mention this achievement as Fath al-Fatuh?
It is man and his thought that works, not tools. Hassan Bagheri’s thought was based on Imam’s educational method. Imam gave field to this generation and they grew up and were able to manage the war. Today, neither the IRGC nor the army denies that Hassan Bagheri was the designer of the operations. Anyone who denies, his documents are available. No one can deny Hassan Bagheri’s handwriting. We have preserved the manuscripts. On November 22, 1960, he says that he wrote the Bostan operation plan. It says that we have prepared the operation plan to liberate Khorramshahr. For a young person to be able to design and plan, implement those plans and achieve success with the thought and spirit of martyrdom and Ashura culture, is victory. In my opinion, today this conquest has gone beyond the geographical borders of Iran. Fath al-Fatuh is Imam Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah of Lebanon. This is the result of the thinking of the Imam and the Supreme Leader; Because this humanization continues even after Imam. This thinking is revolutionary thinking. Ashurai culture strengthens the spirit of self-sacrifice in people and this is a great victory.
Considering that you were informed about various affairs later as one of the senior commanders of the IRGC, what is your opinion about the performance of Shahid Bagheri, his management and positive actions, and the impact he had on the continuation of the war even after his martyrdom?
In my opinion, Shahid Bagheri’s martyrdom was the beginning of his growth and in the future we will see where this growth will reach. If we cannot use this thinking for the future generation, we will never be able to reach our destination. Hassan Bagheri entered the war at the age of 23 and was martyred at the age of 26. He was only in the war for 28 months, but his thinking remained; A thought that will be exploited in the future. Hassan Bagheri is a role model for the future generation. Today, we can see how influential his administration was in the university with the publication of these works left by Shahid Bagheri. Shahid Bagheri had a plan for his executive work; A program that was constantly being renewed and did not stop. An example of the words of Hazrat Amir (peace be upon him) who says, “Be hopeless today for tomorrow.” His intelligence, attention and perseverance on the road were his distinctive characteristics. It did not change the line and the hand was placed where it should be. A very important characteristic of him was that he did not react to issues. He himself took the initiative and his action forced the enemy to react.
